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A continuous time non-cooperative n-person Markov game with a stopped set is 
studied in this paper. We prove that, in the game process with or without discount 
factor, there exists an optimal stationary point of strategies, called the equilibrium 
point, and each player has his equilibrium stationary strategy, such that the total 
expected discounted or non-discounted gain are maximums. 
1. 1NTRoDuc-t10~ 
The concept of a discrete time Markov game was first formulated by 
Sharpley (61. In 1973, Parthasarathy investigated a Markov game with a 
discount factor with infinite horizon. In this paper we consider a continuous 
time non-cooperative n-person Markov game with a stopped set in which the 
game processes with a discount factor or nondiscount factor are investigated. 
We consider the optimization problems as to maximize the total expected 
discounted gain and non-discounted gain, and we prove that, in the n-person 
Markov game with a stopped set under the condition that players choose 
their actions independently without any collaboration with each others, there 
exists a stationary equilibrium point in which each component corresponds 
to the equilibrium stationary strategy of each player. 
The sufficient conditions for the optimal stationary strategies of Markov 
game processes with a stopped set were first formulated by the authors in (81 
which is the case of two-person zero-sum Markov game with or without the 
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discount factor. This paper is a continuation of the idea in [8] of a non- 
cooperative n-person Markov game. For that purpose, we start, in Section 2, 
with some notation and formulate the game processes for non-cooperative n- 
person games. In Section 3, we give three lemmas for the necessity of 
proving the existence of the stationary equilibrium point in each game 
process. Here we define a mapping of point to set and show this mapping is 
upper semi-continuous, and hence the fixed point theorem of Fan [ 1 ] is 
applicable. This fixed point will play an essential role for which the 
stationary equilibrium point exists in our game processes. The main 
theorems are proved in Sections 4 and 5 respectively for the case of games 
with a discount factor and the case of games without a discount factor. 
It is remarkable that the stopping time r is a random variable; thus in the 
non-discounted Markov games, the existence of an equilibrium point holds 
some distinct conditions. The main difference point between two-person zero- 
sum games and non-cooperative n-person games is that the first case is a 
minimax optimization problem in two persons and the second case is an 
optimization problem of maximizing the total expected gain for each player 
in n-person players. 
2. FORMULATIONS FOR R-PERSON GAMES 
In this paper, we define a continuous time non-cooperative n-person 
Markov game with a discount factor and stopped set by a set of 2(n + 2) 
objects (S, S’, A,, A, ,.,., A,, q, r(l), r(*‘,..., r’n), a). Here we define the 
following: 
(1) S = { 1, 2 ,..., s ,... ) is a countable set of states in the system, namely, 
state space. 
(2) S’ c S is a subset in which the system of games will be stopped if 
the state goes into S’; we call this set S’ a stopped set. 
(3) Each Aj is a compact Bore1 subset of a polish space in which the 
player j will choose his action from A,, and is called an action space for 
player j, j = 1, 2 ,..., n. 
(4) q = qs,.(6) is a bounded function on S for every (s, 6) = 
(s, a, , a, ,..., a,) E S x ny=, A, and is called a transition rate function. 
(5) r:‘(C) = P(s, C), s E S, is a sequence of continuous functions on 
E = (a,, a, ,..., a,) E nf=, A,; such sequence {ry’} is uniformly convergent 
in n;= I Ai ; we call rub a reward rate function of player j, j = 1, 2 ,..., n. 
(6) a is a positive number, as a discount factor. 
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In particular, if a = 0, the system of games is defined by 2(n + 1) + 1 
objects 
(S, S’,A,, A, ,..., A,, q, r”‘, r(‘) ,..., rtn’) 
and is called a continuous time non-cooperative n-person non-discounted 
Markov game with a stopped set. 
In the game processes, we assume that the strategies for each player j are 
independent of the past history processes; it depends only on the present 
state s E S and each player j chooses independently an action a E Al. 
j = 1, 2,.... n, without any collaboration with other players. 
By this result, each player j gains a reward r:‘(C) unit of money and the 
game process moves to a new state k E S which is governed by the transition 
rate q,,,(C). Then our optimization problems are to maximize the total 
expected gain with or without a discount factor for each player until the 
game process arrives at a stopped set S’. 
The strategy n”’ = n”‘(t) of player j chosen at time I E 10, co) is a 
specified family (,$‘} such that 
(i) pu)“‘(. 1 s) is a probability measure on the Bore1 measurable space 
(Aj, 21j) for any f E [0, co) and s E S. 
(ii) fiti’ . (M 1 ) s is a Lebesgue measurable function on [0, co) for any 
given Bore1 set ME ‘?Ij and s E S. 
We. call such a strategy a Markov strategy. Especially if &’ = n”‘(t) is 
independent of the time t, the strategy is said to be stationary. In this case, or 
any time f E 10. co), there is a mapping rrU’ such that 
p 
I = p: s + P(A,). 
where !‘(A,) is the set of all probability measures on 
(Aj 1 sj), j = 1, 2 ,..., n. 
For the existence of Markov processes, we need the following 
assumptions. 
(Al) Let qJti) be a continuous function on ~7 = (a,, a2,..., a,,) E 
nl=, Ai for every given pair (s, k) E S x S and having the following 
properties: for any C? E ny=, Ai, 
CL.,@) a 0 if s # k. 
T q,*,(a) = 0, 
k:l 
Iss.s(~)l GM* 
156 LA1 AND TANAKA 
For any set (rr(‘), x(*),..., II(“)) of strategies of players 1, 2,..., n, the tran- 
sition rate functions are defined as follows: for any t > 0, 
qsJJt, 7P’, 7P ,...) 7P) 
where each strategy a”’ is specified by the family {#‘}. It is clear that each 
qs,k(t, n”‘,..., a’“‘) is measurable in t. It follows from (Al) that we have the 
assumption 
(Al’) 
q& n”‘, 7P ,..., a’“‘) > 0 if s # k, 
-? qs,&, 7?(l)..., 
k:l 
7P’) = 0, 
/q&t, d’) ,..., +))I < hf 
for any s E S and some positive constant h4. 
Throughout this appear, we denote the transition rate matrix by 
Q(i) = (q&); S, k E s } 
corresponding to dE ny=, A,, and for any set (x(l), xc*),..., x”‘)) of 
strategies for players at the time r > 0, the transition rate matrix is denoted 
by 
Q(t, n”),..., ~6”‘) = {qS,k(t, a”‘,..., I+“)); s, k E S}. (1) 
Under assumption (Al ‘), it is known (cf. Kakumanu [2]) that there exists a 
unique transition probability matrix 
F(t,, f, XC” )...) d”)) = {fs,k(to, t, ~6” ,..., dn’); s, k E S 1 
corresponding to Q(r, rr(“,..., x(“)) which satisfies the Kolmogorov forward 
differential equation: 
$F(f,, t, 7P) ,...) d”)) = F(t,, f, ?I(‘) ,..., a’“‘) Q(f, d” ,..., d”)) (2) 
with initial condition 
F(t,, t,, 7P) )..., n’“‘) = z almost all t E [to, co) 
where Z is an infinite identity matrix. 
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Later we shall use the fact that the Markov process 
(X(r, R”),..., 7P); t > to} 
corresponding to the transition probability matrix 
F(f,, I, d’) ,..., d”‘) 
exists and is well behaved. If t, = 0, we write 
F(0, I, 7r(” ,..., II’“)) = F(r, 76” )..., 71’“)). 
Throughout our discussion, we are starting from 1, = 0. 
Corresponding to the stopped set S’, we assume 
(A2) For each player j, if s’ ES’, the function $(a) = ru)(s’) is 
independent of ti E ny=, Ai. 
Under assumption (A2), every player j chooses his strategy rru’ at time t 
on state s E S, and then he will have the total expected gain given by 
n 
‘y’(t. II’*) ,...) d”)) = I * * - ry a, ,,.., a,) n dp;“(q) I ( _ rq=,Ai _ i= I 
if sES-S’ 
= #J)(s’) if s=s’ES’ 
(3) 
Clearly ru)(t IL(‘) 
initial sta;e s’E 
IL’“‘) is Lebesgue measurable in f and hence for an 
S,“;;;e player j will have the total expected gain with discount 
factor a which is defined to be 
wY’(a, 7+‘),..., 7~“‘)) =E [I,’ e-“‘r”‘(X(t), dl’,..., d”)) dt 
+ e-“‘@(X(t)) 1 X(0) = s , 
I 
(4) 
where r is the first time t such that the random variable X(t) arrives at the 
stopped set S’. In this case, for any initial state s E S, each player j 
corresponding to the set (z(‘),..., 7c(“)) of strategies hopes to have his total 
expected gain. If there exists a set of Markov strategies (IL”‘, II(‘),..., x(“‘) 
such that 
t&‘(a, XC”,..., 71’“)) = sup @(a, 7~“) ,..., d-‘), a”‘, 7P+” ,..., d”‘), (5) 
oukP’A,P 
then this set (z(I), z(“,..., z(“)) is called an equilibrium point, and each 
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strategy zci) is called the equilibrium strategy for player j, j= 1, 2,..., n. 
Especially if a = 0, then we define 
iy~‘(7?“‘,..., 76”‘) 
r”‘(X(t), d’),..., d”‘) dt + +)(X(z)) 1 X(0) = s 1 (6) 
as the total expected gain of the player j at the initial state s E S. In this 
case, the equilibrium point and the equilibrium strategy are defined similarly 
for each player. 
3. NOTATION AND SOME LEMMAS FORTHE EXISTENCE 
OF THE STATIONARY EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY 
For convenience, in this section we introduce the following notation: 
For a set of stationary strategies t$(‘), ,u”),...,,D(~‘), we mean that it is a 
mapping from state space S into I-Jr=, P(A,). 
We let 
p = (lb”, p,..., P”“)E [fifYAi)]‘v 
P ,-‘a = (,pp’*’ ,...) pci-l~,pti+ 1) ...) /p’) E [ fi 
i= I.itj 
P(A,)]s~ 
(jj; .q = (jp’)...) p’, oyp+ 1) )...) P”“)E [fiPMi)]‘v 
where 
0’) E [P(Aj)]‘, 
ry’@i) = . ..- I ry’(a ,,..., a,) fi dp”‘(a,), 
J J i=l 
qs,J,4 = j - .- j qs,&, T...9 a,) .fi &“‘(aJ 
Since every action space Ai, i = 1, 2 ,..., n, is a compact metric space, it 
follows that nr=, A, is compact and ny=, P(A,) is weakly compact. And 
for any s, k E S, the reward rate function ry)@) and transition rate function 
qs,k#) are bounded continuous on ny=r P(A,). 
Next for each i, i = 1, 2 ,..., n, we denote by Ci(S) the set of all bounded 
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(continuous) functions u on the discrete state space S in which the function 
value is equal to r”)(s’) whenever s’ E S’. For u E Ci(S), we define 
Then the space Ci(S) is a Banach space under the supremum norm I/ 11. 
Now for a set ,L = @“‘,,u’*’ ,...,p(“)) of stationary strategies, we define a 
new one step transition probability matrix P@) by 
p(pj=z+;Q@)y (7) 
where I is the identity matrix, M is the positive constant which appeared in 
(Al), and Q(j) is the matrix (qs.#)) formed from transition rate functions. 
Here an element of P(J) is defined by 
where a,,, = 0 if s # k and 6,,, = 1. 
Since n;=, P(A,) is compact and ry’(ji) and ps,J,ii) are continuous on 
n;=, P(A,) for any states s, k E S, the supremum of these functions are 
surely attainable. Hence we can define an operator 
P’: Cj(S) --+ Cj(S) 
(T%j(sj = rn$x ((a + M)-’ r~‘@; fP) 
+ M(a + M) - ’ P@ oU’) u(s)} 7 if sES-S’ 
= #qsy if s =s’ E S’, 
(9) 
where a > 0 is a discount factor in the game processes, and 
Since 0 < M(a + M))’ < 1, the operator 7’“’ on the Banach space Cj(S) is a 
contraction mapping, and by the fixed point theorem, it is known that it has 
a unique fixed point 
and the following lemma ho,ai”l’““‘) ’ ‘j(S) 
409’R?‘I I I 
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LEMMA 1. For each i and any F(s) E n;t=, P(A,), there exists a 
vz!. C;“‘) E C,(S) such that 
c~vb’;~(j”‘) = my (rj”@; ocn) + Q@; #‘) v~!~CU^‘~‘)} 
if sES-SS’, 
v~;s,c;“‘) = r(i)(s’) if s = s’ E S’, 
where v~!~(,L?~‘) is the function value of thefixedpoint vz!. (~9~‘) of T”’ at the 
state s E S. 
Proof: By the definition of Tci’, if s E S - S’, 
p)vjli)pi))(s) = vtfs$i)) 
= ~-I-IX {(a + M) - ’ rf)#; f+‘) 
+ M(a + M) - ’ P@; 8’) v~!,~^“‘)}. 
Multiplying a + M in both sides of the above formula and replacing the 
matrix P@) by the matrix Q(U) from (7), it follows that 
(a + M) v~!s@l”‘) = IIIIX { ri’)@; u(l)) 
+ (MI + QQ7; c+‘) v$o;“‘)}. 
This implies that 
av$(J”‘) = III?: (t-ii’ (~7, @) + Q@; CT(~)) v~~~C;“‘)}. 
If s = s’ E S’, it then has 
vbf!,,($(i’) = T”)v(s’) = rfi)(s’). Q.E.D. 
For fi E [nl= 1 P(Ai)]’ and vz!. (j?(l)) E C,(S) in Lemma 1, we introduce 
the following notation: 
for each i and any s E S, 
~jO(jj; .(i)) = r;i)@i (#i)) + QW; o(i)) v~!sj(i)) 
if sES-S 
= rci)(s) if s=s’ES’ 
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and 
G”‘($““‘) = {A”’ 1 L;‘@; I”‘) = ,,i,ctz;,A ,) Lji’@; c+‘)}. 
I 
Since P(A,) is compact and r:“(L), q&7) are continuous on nl= I P(A,) for 
each i and all s E S, the maximum exists surely, it follows that G’“(J?‘~‘) is a 
non-empty closed subset of P(A,). This G”‘@“‘) is a set of all equilibrium 
strategies for the player i, i = 1, 2,..., n. Thus we can define a mapping 
G(j) = (j = (A”’ ,..., lcn)); Ati’ e G”‘@“‘), i = 1 3 2 ,*.-1 nl 
for any p(s) E nl=, P(A,). 
If the point to set mapping G is upper semi-continuous, then the fixed 
point theorem in Fan [ 1 ] is applicable. For this purpose, we need to show 
the following lemmas. 
LEMMA 2. Let (&} be a sequence in the set [jJ;=, P(Ai)Js such that 
&(s) + p(s) E nl=, P(Ai) weakly as k -+ 03. Then the sequence (uz!. @y’) }, 
of functions in Ci(S) is convergent uniformly to a function uz!. (~7”‘) E Ci(S), 
where for each index k, II:!. (,@) is a fixed point of T”’ in Lemma 1 for the 
ith player. 
Proof: By the fixed point 0::. (j^lf’) E Ci(S) of T”’ for each i, we have 
for any s E S 
-p&7; u(i)) u~!t@‘i’) . (10) 
Since (r!*‘(d)} is uniformly convergent on n;t=, Ai, (see definition (5) of 
Section 2), (ry’(ji)}. converges uniformly on nl=r P(A,). That is, for any 
E > 0 there exists s0 E S depending on E only such that 
If-i”(E) - r$Ql = 
whenever s > s,, 
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and since r:‘(L) is continuous on FE nF=, P(Ai)]‘, if & +p weakley in 
rK=, WiY, we then have 
( ry(lik) - rI”fj.i)I < & for any s E S. 
Hence the first term on the right-hand side of (10) tends to zero uniformly in 
s E S. While the second term on the right-hand side of (10) is not greater 
than 
Here as k + co, ,Uk + ,L& the transition probabilities p,,,Cu;, ; di’) -+ps,,@; di’) 
uniformly in a”’ and s E S, and since u$@~‘) E Ci(S) is bounded, the first 
term in the bracket (., . } goes to zero. The second term in ( ., . } is not 
greater than 1) ~2:. (2;‘) - vz!. (L”‘)II since ~,pJU) = 1. Consequently, (10) 
implies 
and so 
since 0 < M(a + M))’ < 1, this implies 
that is, 
- lim (1 u:!. @t’) - ~2:. @P)ll = 0, 
k-m 
1) ug. (if’) - oh’;. (p’)ll -+ 0 (k -+ co). Q.E.D. 
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LEMMA 3. The mapping 
is upper semi-continuous. 
Proof. Since G is upper semi-continuous on a compact subset 
[[I;=, P(Ai)lS of a locally convex space if and only if G(U) is closed in 
lnl=) P(Ai)lS* ‘t I is sufficient to prove that G@) is a closed subset of 
$Ti= , P(A,) 1” for P(s) E nr=, P(A i). Let Qik ; ,I:‘) be a sequence in G(J) 
(& ; /q’) -3 (/i; I”‘) as k+oo. 
That is. 
A;’ E (p(j) 
such that 
ius) -+ P(s) and n;‘(s) 4 P(s) as k-roe 
for any s E S, i = 1, 2 ,..., n. 
By the result in Lemma 1, for any index k and each i, 
aLf,($y) = In+xxLy (&; di’) 
= Lj”@,; 12’) 
and for any U(~)(S) E P(Ai), 
au~~s@~‘) >, L j”(& ; u(i)). (11) 
As k-+q &--*p- weakly in [nl=, P(A,)]’ or .D,Js) -p(s) weakly in 
nl=, P(A,) for all s E S. It follows from Lemma 2 that t~~!~(#) converges 
to ZI~!~($“) uniformly in C,(S). Therefore inequality (11) tends to 
aL,z!,jl”b) > ~ybfj; .(i)) 
and then 
ao~!sp(i)) = L~)w; J(i)) 
2 L:i)G; .fib) 
for any o’~‘(.s) E P(A,). Hence 
A(i) E @i)pi)) 
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and @ A(“) E G@), i = 1 2 
p(r) E hf= r P(A,), and hen&“;& 
n. This shows that GM) is closed for every 
is upper semi-continuous. Q.E.D. 
By Lemma 3, it follows that Fan’s fixed theorem (cf. Fan [ 11) holds and 
there exists a fixed point ,~7* E G(,Z*) depending on a such that 
p* = @*(Q*(2) ,...) p*‘“‘). 
That is, for any s E S-S’, we have 
where we use p,*i, = fi*(i) throughout. 
4. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM STATIONARY STRATEGIES 
By these preparation in previous sections, we can prove the following 
theorem. 
THEOREM 1. Under assumptions (Al) and (A2), there exists an 
equilibrium point in the non-cooperative n-person discounted Markov game 
with a stopped set, and every player possesses the stationary equilibrium 
strategy. 
Proof: Let @*; 1”‘) be a set of stationary strategies for n-person players. 
By the property of ji *, for any Markov strategy a”’ of player i, and any time 
t E [0, oo), it follows from Lemma 1 that 
au~!,@l;r,,) > rp)(t, ,i*, di’) + Q(t, p*; uCi’) v~~!~(jj;“i,) 
if SE S -S’. (12) 
We define an operator Rcs;o’n) on u E C,(S) by 
R$*;““‘)y(~) = Irn e-=‘F(;(t; fi*; ati’) o(s) dt 
0 
= ErT’;o tn m 
[I 
e-%(X(t)) dt ( X(0) = s , 
0 I 
where E” is the expectation related to a stationary strategy ,IZ Then by the 
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Kolmogorov forward differential equation, we have 
uh’!sc;,*,,) = R$‘;“‘i”[aI - Q(t, /?*; a”‘)] u$@:,,). 
In fact, by calculation 
.cc 
=a I e -=‘F(f, ,E*, di)) u~~,(L;,) dt -0 
.a, 
- 1 e-“‘F(t, p*; uti’) Q(f, ji*; cP) u~!~C;&) dt 
-0 
= - ia: ~(t, p*; d’)) us!,@&) d(e-“‘) 
-0 
-Jo* e-“’ f F(t, ,ii*; c@) u:;,@;,) dr 
= (--F(t, p*; u”)~~~~C;;“i,) e-Pf]r 
= F(0, p*; u”‘) uhr’!s@^,*i)) 
= u, s ‘y @;Fr,) for all sES-S’. 
On the other hand, 
= E XC e-“‘{auk!,,,, fj$,) 
0 
- Q(t, ,2*; uci)) u~~,,,,(ji~,)} dt 1 X(0) = s 1 
=E [jI+jm lX(O)=s], 
z 
where r is the first time t for which the random variable X(t) arrives into S’ 
at the initial state s E S. The second term in the last equality can be written 
as 
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Hence 
= E[e-arubj!x(r)@&) X(O) = s] 
= E[e-“rr’i)(X(t)) 1 X(0) = s]. 
u~~~(,L&) = E I,’ e-at(av~~xJ,i~,) 
- Q(f,/i*; di)) u&, ,Z$,)) dc 
+ e-nrr(i)(X(r)) ( X(0) = s 
I 
(13) 
From (12) we solve for -Q by substituting into the integrand of (13), we 
then have 
+ eeQrr”‘(X(r)) 1 X(0) = s 
I 
= y/j”(q jj*; a”‘). (14) 
The last identity follows from the definition of total expected gain with 
discount factor a for player i. 
On the other hand, from the behavior of ,C*, we see that 
cfuh’~s@&) = tnlzc au~~,(p*; di’) 
= max L:)@*; .Ci)) 
*Ii) 
= rii’@*) + Q(,i*) ~~!~(,i&). 
By the same argument as used in (13), we have 
(15) 
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for all s E S - S’. Therefore, by (14) and (15) it follows that the set of 
stationary strategies 
depending on a, i.e., the fixed point of the mapping G in Lemma 3, is an 
equilibrium point in the game processes, and each player i possesses ~8, as 
the equilibrium stationary strategy. Q.E.D. 
5. EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM STATIONARY STRATEGIES 
IN NON-DISCOUNTED MARKOV GAMES 
In this section, we consider the equilibrium stationary strategies of the 
non-discounted Markov game 
(S, S’, A,, A, ,..., A,, q, r”‘, I-(” .,.., r’n’) 
with stopped set S’. In the non-discounted Markov game processes, we need 
some further assumptions: 
(A2’) For any s E S - S’, the reward rate r!“(C) is a non-negative 
continuous function on 6 = (a, ,..., a,) E nl=, Ai, and if s’ E S, 
r!?(G) = rCi’(s’) is non-negative and independent of 5. 
(A3) For any s E S, yli”@) is uniformly bounded on the stationary 
strategy p E [nl=, P(Ai)]” for each player i, and the first entrance time r of 
the random variable X(t, ,ii; uCi’) which goes into the stopped set S’ is finite 
with probability one. 
Then we can prove the following theorem: 
THEOREM 2. Under (Al). (A2’) and (A3), the non-cooperative n-person 
non-discounted Markov game with stopped set has an equilibrium point and 
every player possesses the stationary equilibrium strategy. 
Proof. In Theorem 1 we have seen that for discount factor a > 0 in the 
game processes, there exists an equilibrium point pz and every player i has 
stationary equilibrium strategy flX,iJ. In the case of non-discounted game 
processes, we take the stationary strategy ,C E [nl=, P(A,)]” by ,C,* for 
a > 0, then by the assumption (A2’), 
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v%@ ) = E [ I, * r”‘(X(t), ,ii;) dr + r”‘(X(r)) 1 X(0) = s 1 
2E =e- 
11 
arr(‘)(X(t), ~7:) dt + e -=W(X(r)) 1 X(0) = s 
0 I 
= (US” (a, iii,*), 
where r is the first entrance time of the Markov process {X(t); t > 0) into the 
stopped set S’. Note that this r is a random variable depending on the state 
s E S. Hence for any a > 0 and any s E S, 
= sup u”‘(S) EPU(, 
lj/1”(a, pz ; d”) 
= ~%x(i,). 
It follows from (A3) that for any s E S and each i, 
for any Q > 0. Therefore, for any s E S, {u~!~@$,,) is uniformly bounded on 
n;l=, P(A,). Since S is countable, by Cauchy’s diagonalization method, 
there exists a sequence (a,) tending to 0 as n --) co such that jiz,-,E* 
weakly in [nf==, P(A,)]’ and 
exists for all s E S - S’. It follows from (16) that 
u~“cu^&) < ryj”@*). 
Again, it can be shown that 
U~‘ylifi)) > lyj”(p*). 
In fact, by Lemma 1, 
(17) 
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tends to 
0 = my (rji$i*; di’) + QW*; di’) o;“@^x,)) 
as a, + 0, for any s E S - S’. For any u’~‘(s) E P(Ai) and any t E (0, co), 
we can rewrite the above identity to be 
0 > rj”(t, /i*, c+) + Q(t, ji*; uci’) u:“(J;,). (18) 
Putting 5, = 5 A m = min(r, m) for any positive integer m,, it is easily seen 
that r, is also a stopping time and T,,, + r as m -+ 00. Then, by (13) in the 
proof of Theorem 1, 
u~~~,,&J= E ~~me-“n’(a,r-Q(t,p~~;u’i’} . u:;,,,,cu^; “,,, )dt 
+e -OnrmU~l,,,,,,C;x,,i,) I x(o) = s 1 
tends to 
u;“@&) = E 
[ 
Jim (-Q(t,p*; u’~‘) u;;,,(,i;,) dt 
+ u~:,,)c;~), I X(O) = s 1 ; 
whenever a,, -+ 0, we then obtain, by (18) and (19), 
u~‘cu^$,) > E 
[ 
1’” r”‘(X(t), ,ii*; u’~)) dt 
-0 
As m is large enough, r, = r for any sample path; thus 
G,,,@X,> = dw3 
= r’i’(s’), s’ = X(r) E S’. 
Hence letting m + 00 in (20), we have 
U:‘@;,) 2 E 1’ r”‘(X(t), p*; Uci)> dt 
0 
+ @(X(r)) 1 X(0) = s 1 = lyy’@*). 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
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Consequently, by (21) and (17), we obtain 
The proof is then complete. Q.E.D. 
Note that the stopping time r of the non-discounted game processes is a 
random variable. Thus if we assume that the expectation 
E”[t 1 X(0) = s] 
is bounded (uniformly) for any stationary strategy p(s) E nl=, P(A i), s E S, 
then the function u 
following inequality: ‘.” 
(jz) of the discounted Markov game satisfies the 
for any initial state s E S. Since r and r are bounded, (ubj!,(,Lx)} is uniformly 
bounded on Pz and S; thus as (A3) is replaced by 
(A3’) ELj[r 1 X(0) = s] is bounded for any stationary strategy for any 
s E s. 
Then such an infinite bounded set has a limit point, that is, there exists a 
subsequence {uzi ,@~,)},, that converges uniformly on s E S to a function 
u(~‘@*) E C,(S) as n + co. Hence we can restate Theorem, 2 as follows: 
THEOREM 2’. Under (Al), (A2) and (A3’), the equilibrium point of the 
game processes in Theorem 2 exists, and each player possesses the stationary 
equilibrium strategy. 
REFERENCES 
1. K. FAN, Fixed point and rninimax theorem in locally convex topological linear space, Proc. 
Nat. Acad. Sci. USA 88 (1952), 121-126. 
2. P. KAKUMANU, “Continuous Time Markov Decision Models with Applications to 
Optimization Problems,” Technical Report 63, Dept. of O.R., Cornell University, 1969. 
3. A. MAITRA AND T. PARTHASARATHY, On stochastic games, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 5 
(1970), 289-300. 
4. J. F. NASH, Equilibrium points in n-person games, Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA 36 (1950), 
4849. 
5. T. PARTHASARATHY, Discounted, positive and noncooperative stochastic games, Internaf. 
J. Game Theory 2 (1973), 25-27. 
NON-COOPERATIVE n-PERSON GAME 171 
6. L. S. SHAPLEY, Stochastic games, Proc. Nat. Acad. Sci. USA 39 (1953), 1095-I 100. 
7. K. Tanaka and H. Homma, Continuous time non-cooperative n-person Markov games, 
Bull. Math. Statist. 18 (1978), 93-105. 
8. K. TANAKA AND H. C. LAI, Two persons zero-sum Markov game with a stopped set. J. 
Math. Anal. Appl.. in press. 
